Effects of Captive Supplies on Spot Market Prices: A Panel Data Analysis by Abebe, Abeje B.
EFFECTS  OF CAPTIVE SUPPLIES ON 
SPOT   MARKET PRICES : 
A PANEL DATA ANALYSIS
BY
ABEJE BIRU ABEBE




Submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate College of the
Oklahoma State University in partial





EFFECTS  OF  CAPTIVE  SUPPLIES  ON
SPOT  MARKET  PRICES:
A  PANEL  DATA  ANALYSIS
Thesis Approved:
                                Dr. Chanjin Chung 
______________________________________________
Thesis Adviser
                                  Dr. Art Stoecker 
____________________________________________     
                                   Dr. Clem Ward 
______________________________________________
                                 Dr. A. Gordon Emsile 
____________________________________________
Dean of Graduate College
iii
Acknowledgement
I would like to thank the Department of Agricultural Economics in the Oklahoma 
State University for providing me the resources to complete my Masters Degree in 
Agricultural Economics.
My heart felt thanks goes to Dr. Chanjin Chung, my advisor, for his valuable 
inputs in my thesis.  Without his contribution, the completion of the paper would have 
been extremely difficult if it was not impossible.  I would also like to thank his 
willingness to serve as my advisor and for bearing with me when I worked with him as 
his research assistant.
I would also like to extend my thanks to Dr. Notie Lansford for letting me be his 
teaching assistant.  It was a valuable experience indeed.  Dr. Art Stoecker and Dr. Clem 
Ward have contributed a great deal as their capacity of committee members.  Dr. Ward 
provided me the data set I used in this thesis. 
My stay in Stillwater was made not only possible but also pleasant by the brothers 
Abenet, Dagmawi and Micheal Yimenu.  No succession of words can express what they 
did for me.  I also enjoyed the company of the Ethiopian Community in Stillwater.
I am grateful to my parents, Dr. Biru Abebe and Aklile W/Mariam, my sister,
Nigist Biru and my brother-in-law, Daniel Molla, my cousin, Terefe Hiruy and his wife,







IV. Model Specification ..................................................................................................19
V. Results and Discussion .............................................................................................25






1.  Descriptive Statistics...........................................................................................34
2.  The Breusch-Pagan Lagrange multiplier .......................................................... 35
3. Granger Causality Test ........................................................................................36
4. Granger Causality Test ........................................................................................36
5. Pearson’s Correlation Coefficient........................................................................37
6. Pooled Data Estimation Using Reduced Form of Koyck’s Method Form ..........38
7. Pooled Data Estimation Using Distributed Lag form of Koyck’s Method..........39
8. Panel Data Estimation Using Reduced Form of Koyck’s Method Form.............40
9. Panel Data Estimation Using Distributed Lag form of Koyck’s Method............41
10. Price Elasticity. ....................................................................................................42




In recent years contract market has become an important transaction method in 
the U.S. livestock industry. Agricultural Economic Report (MacDonald et al, 2004) 
reports that contract market handled 12 percent of the value of the U.S. agricultural 
production in 1969, but increased its share to 28 percent in 1991 and 36 percent in 2001.  
The top four packers’ process approximately 80 percent of the U.S. fed cattle, and the use 
of captive supplies has more than doubled from 22.5 percent to 50 percent in 1996.  In 
the pork production, meatpackers acquired 87 percent of their hogs in spot markets in 
1993, while procuring 11 percent through marketing contracts and 2 percent from their 
own farms (Hayenga, Rhodes, Grimes, and Lawrence, 2002).  By 1997, the use of spot 
markets fell by half, and the spot market was able to handle only one-quarter of hog 
shipments by 2000, while half of the hog shipments were through marketing contracts 
and another quarter were from packer-owned farms (Hayenga, Rhodes, Grimes, and 
Lawrence, 2002).  Contracts now cover nearly one-half of all livestock production, which 
is a significant increase from one-third in 1991-93 (MacDonald et al., 2004).  Important 
research questions include: Does the contract market strategically depress the spot market
price?; Will farmers lose or gain by the shift of the structure from the spot market to the 
contract market?
This research tries to respond to the above questions.  The general objective is to 
examine the effect of captive supply contracts on the spot market prices.  Specifically, the 
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objective is to estimate the effect of the amount of cattle supplied on marketing 
agreement and forward contract on the spot market prices. The study also estimates the 
effect of quality of cattle on the spot market prices. An econometric model of panel data
was developed. The explanatory variables in the model are contract market, future 
market, quality of cattle and transportation cost.  
Recently, the use of captive supplies in cattle procurement has been intensely 
debated in the U.S. beef industry.  The USDA has been authorized to ensure competition 
in the meat industry under the Packers and Stockyards Act and has investigated the 
impact of captive supplies on spot market prices.  Under the Packers and Stockyards Act,
the mandatory price reporting has been imposed on packers starting from April, 2001 
(Ward and Hornung, 2004). 
There are basically three types of contract markets: marketing agreement, forward
contract, and vertical integration (MacDonald et al., 2004). Marketing contract gives 
great control over product specification to the farmer and reduces the price risk 
associated with spot market pricing.  Prices are determined before harvesting of crops or 
shipment of animals based on pricing formulas that both sides agreed in their contracts.
The price calculations are usually based on spot market prices some weeks before the 
maturity date of the contract. This reduces the farmers’ involvement in management and 
increases the packers control over managerial issues.  Future contracts tend to give more 
managerial power to packers over the farmers. Under the contracts, packers typically 
provide substantial amount of inputs and technical advices, which give them more 
opportunities to control over the product than spot market transactions.  Pricing also 
considers input values, output quantity and quality.  In case of forward contract Ward, 
3
Koontz, and Schroeder (1996) note that, “The feeder has the option of determining when 
to price the cattle (i.e., select a future’s market price) and from that futures market price, 
a cash selling price is computed, based on the agreed up on basis.”   In case of vertical 
integration, there is no market price decision or contracts involved because the vertical 
integration is a single ownership of the cattle producer and packer.  Pricing is simply an 
internal managerial decision.
Beef packers heavily rely on captive supplies in the form of engaging in future 
market contracts or vertical integration with feeders.  The basic reason for the strategic 
shift in the management system is believed to be that captive supplies will enable packers 
to specify quality attributes of meat on the delivery and can pay premium or discount 
based on the evaluation.  Some researchers claim that these types of contractual 
arrangements are likely to depress the spot market price and have a negative impact on 
the income and livelihood of some farmers (Crespi and Sexton, 2004; Azzam, 1998; and 
Xia and Sexton, 2004).
The Agricultural Economic Report (MacDonald et al, 2004) reported that the 
growth of captive supplies in the beef industry may have impact on cash market prices, 
which would affect all the stakeholders including farmers, packers, researchers and the 
policy makers.  Previous studies show that there is a negative correlation between the 
contract market price and the spot market price (Ward and Hornung, 2004; Schroeter and 
Azzam, 2004).  Whether the relationship is just a correlation between captive supplies 
and spot market prices or there is actually a causal relationship between them is debated. 
Both Sexton and Zhang (2004) and Schroeter and Azzam (2004), show that the 
correlation between captive supplies and spot market prices has a causal relationship.  
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The negative relationship is a deliberate management practice by packers (Sexton and 
Zhang, 2004).  They argue that packers use a geographic buffer zone within which they 
do not face competition from other packers.  This creates a disincentive to jump the 
buffer zone and involve in the competitive market.  Sexton and Zhang (2004), claim that, 
this action of packers will, therefore, reduce the spot market price.  The negative 
relationship, Schroeter and Azzam (2004) argue, is not between the contemporaneous 
levels of captive supplies and the spot market prices but rather between the amount of 
captive supplies and the ex ante expectation of a change in price.
Previous studies have focused only on either spatial or temporal dimension in 
their models.  The current study considers both temporal and spatial dimensions and 
therefore conducts panel data analysis.  The spatial dimension of our panel data analysis 
helps to capture differences that arise due to geographical and socio-economic 
differences of states. This study includes five states; Kansas, Texas-Oklahoma, 
Nebraska, Colorado and New Mexico. These states are selected based on data from 
GIPSA that show s that the majority of cattle producers are located here and the four 
major packers that are dominating the market are located in these regions. As the number 
of states in the study increases it helps to make generalizations of outcomes at the 
national level.  The five states in the study have different marketing arrangements, and 
therefore a simple time series analysis will not be able to capture the relationship between 
captive supplies and spot market prices.  
The temporal dimension of this study includes time span from April 2001 to 
December 2004.  Previous studies used a maximum of 2 years monthly or weekly data.
The data from both the temporal and spatial dimensions were pooled to see if the same 
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results can be obtained without using a panel data analysis.  SAS outputs revealed that 
most variables in the pool ed data are insignificant. The number of lags in weeks was 
determined by using Pearson’s Correlation Coefficient test.  The effect of the cumulative 
lag was tested using Koyck’s method. 
While specifying the model, some researchers used shipment of cattle at the date 
of maturity as dependent variable for models of both contract marketing and future 
marketing types of captive supplies.  Others used the spot market price as the dependent 
variable.  We conducted a Granger Causality test to determine the cause and effect 
relationship between captive supplies and spot market price.  The PROC VARMAX 
procedure was used in SAS, and based on test results, spot market price was found to be 
the dependent variable while contract markets and future markets were the explanatory 
variables.
Following the studies of Azzam (2000), Ward, Kuntz and Schroeder (1998), 
Schroeter and Azam (2004), and Schroeder et al., (1993) this study controls for quality of 
cattle while examining the effects of captive supplies on the spot market prices.    As 
prices in both types of contract markets (the marketing agreement and future contracts) 
are calculated based on certain attributes of the cattle (like weight at maturity date) it is 
important to control for quality variable in this type of analysis.  Cattle supplied before 
the maturity date are expected to lack the attributes of a good quality while cattle 
supplied after the maturity date are expected to be, among other things, over age. 
Regression analyses were conducted both with and with out the quality variable and 
quality was found to be an important variable that affects the spot market prices in 
context with captive supplies.
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The current study uses better and more updated data than previous studies. 
Earlier, all data about price and income of packers were obtained through the voluntary 
reporting by packers, and therefore, expectedly, were not complete. Responding to 
concerns by farmers and all stake holders, the congress passed an Act whereby packers 
were forced to report data about their price and income levels. The Mandatory Price 
Reporting, which was enforced by congress in 1999, began to be implemented in April
2001.  All previous researches, except for the research by Ward and Hornung (2004), 
made use of the GIPSA/AMS data. Data from GIPSA, in particular price and income 
variables, have the merit of being data of each transaction in the livestock industry. 
However, as they were collected from the voluntary report of packers, have the demerit 
of being incomplete data set.  The new data set is more complete as compared to the data 
set from GIPSA, however, it does not have data of each transaction. It rather has the 
weekly average of the daily transactions of cattle. This paper made use of weekly data of 
prices from the new data set from the mandatory reporting.
Following the introduction, the next section discusses relevant literatures on the 
relationship between captive supplies and spot market prices.  Data and model 




The USDA stipulates that the term, “agricultural contracts,” refers to contracts used 
to arrange for the transfer of agricultural products from farms to downstream users such 
as processors, elevators, integrators, retailers, or other farms.   In recent years agricultural 
contracts have been increasingly implemented in agricultural production.  Agricultural 
products have been increasingly differentiated and specialized to meet consumers’ 
demands.  Therefore, to be able to produce and market the differentiated and specialized 
products, agricultural production has to have a close supply chain management.  This has 
led some farmers to opt for contracts. 
Previous studies indicate that new production technologies, consumers who 
become more sensitive to the product quality and the need for improved coordination 
among participants in the production system are among the forces driving the move from 
spot markets to contracts (Carriquiry and Babcock, 2002). Consumers are becoming 
more discriminating on their choice of meat consumption, and together with new 
production technologies, these necessitate a closer attention of product quality at the farm 
level. Sykuta and Parcell (2001) point out that producers’ introduction of new products 
and services tailored to satisfy consumer demand creates the need for much stricter 
coordination mechanisms than what can be accomplished with traditional spot markets.
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One of the key objectives of contract marketing is to obtain complete market 
information.  Microeconomic theory asserts that free flow of full information is one of 
the bases for the competitive market.  In the spot (competitive) market, the product 
information is obtained based on attributes observable in live animals or harvested 
products.  The observation is made on the spot while the transaction is been taken or in 
auctions.  This information is believed to lead to an equilibrium price.  The equilibrium 
price then sends the ‘right’ message to both consumers and producers in terms of the 
amount of production, attributes of products, cost of production, amount and type of 
inputs employed, taste and preference etc.  The spot market, however, tends to fail to 
send the real signals.  According to Sykuta and Parcell (2001), high quality meat did not 
fetch prices as high as expected.  Consumers did not have enough knowledge 
(information) that made them pay higher prices.  As high quality products are expensive 
to produce, producers will not have an incentive to produce these products if they do not 
get higher prices. On the other hand, the cost advantage of economies of scale led to just 
few buyers which, in effect, gave them also a monopsony power over the market. Full 
information can not be obtained as the number of buyers exceeds overwhelmingly the 
number of sellers in the market.
Livestock producers tend to prefer contracts as they try to avoid fluctuating spot 
market prices.  Many small scale farmers are risk averters and incline to strategies that 
reduce the risk of price fluctuations as they focus on meeting current financial 
obligations.  The ability of farmers to adjust to short term fluctuations is limited as 
compared to industrial good producers.  This will make them liable to shift to risk 
aversion strategies at the expense of reduced prices and income.  Buyers, in this case 
packers, are  in a better position to take the risk as they get their products from diversified 
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sources and by the virtue of being ‘big’ can get out of crisis better than farmers can do.  
The benefit packers can get from shifting risk to their side is a cheaper price of livestock.  
Another reason for farmers to shift from spot market to contracts is due to the high 
transportation cost.  Livestock producers can not move around their animals from one 
buyer to another because the transportation cost is expensive.  It is also true that the 
further the producers try to go, the more risky they need to take by loosing weight and 
probably death of livestock.  In this case contracts come at rescue for the farmers as they 
will give them a guaranteed price and therefore will not have to travel around with cattle. 
The cost of looking for credible buyers on each transaction is also alleviated when 
farmers are engaged in contracts.
Contracts are not without costs and/or risks to farmers.  It is also expensive and 
risky to abide by contracts.  Once a farmer has committed to a specific quantity and 
quality the burden of meeting these specifications is on his shoulders.  If he could not 
abide by the contract, he might end up loosing more than he would have lost if he had not 
engaged in the contract. 
Few packers, who have the market power, may have the capacity of raising the cost 
of entry to the market.  They can make it difficult to other small packers to compete in 
the market. This results in reducing the competition and strengthening their market 
power.  This in effect keeps the spot market prices lower than competitive prices.  The 
meat packing industry, especially, is an industry which benefits highly from economies of 
scale.  That makes it difficult for new packers to enter the industry as the cost of 
slaughtering per animal is high and they can not possibly compete with big packers who 
can effectively reduce that cost.
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Packers use a pricing strategy called Top of the Market (TOMP) that fixes the price 
of cattle at the maturity date of the contract based on the highest price of the spot market 
price at that date (Xia and Sexton, 2004).  This will leave other packers out of the market 
as they can not possibly meet that price at their entry stage.  Ultimately, few packers will 
control the market and exercise oligopsony power to reduce the prices below the 
competitive level. Love and Burtton (1999) also suggest that packers can have an 
exclusive contract to a limited amount of cattle at higher prices without affecting the 
price of other cattle they are buying.  This will give them the double advantage of having 
the right amount of cattle they need (not being in short of cattle) and also reducing the 
competitive price.
(Ward and Hornung, 2004) claim that the shift towards contract markets is a result 
of the failure of the market prices to accurately signal the demand of the consumers.  
Until April 2001, contract market prices were not reported; therefore, it was difficult for 
farmers to make decisions on their sale price.  The unavailability of information gave an 
edge for the packers for an unfair competition.  In 1999, congressional legislation----The 
Livestock Mandatory Price Reporting Act----required large meatpackers to report all 
livestock transaction prices to AMS/USDA.  From its earliest days, the USDA has 
provided various level of agricultural market information to the public.  In 1915, the first 
USDA market news report was issued at Hammond, LA, reporting prices and movement 
of strawberries.  Livestock prices were reported soon after in various formats, and a 
voluntary livestock price reporting system was in place at AMS/USDA by 1946 
(MacDonald et al., 2004).  Information on quality of cattle based on attributes such as 
carcass quality were also standardized and published.  Yield grades provide a numerical 
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five-point scale for evaluating yields of beef from a carcass, based on measurements of 
the thickness of fat at different points on the carcass.
Love and Brutton (1999) stated that on one side, economists see firms' decisions to 
vertically integrate as a means of reducing transactions costs, assuring supply while
reducing price risk, or of alleviating efficiency losses resulting from underutilized 
resources (Azzam 1998). On the other side, economists see vertical integration as a 
means for firms to reduce competition or extract market rents. Heightened concentration 
facilitates collusion among packers, resulting in depressed livestock prices and elevated 
meat prices.
The economies of scale reasons for contract markets include, larger plants have 
lower costs, and operate at higher plant utilization than smaller plants further lowering 
their costs. These enable larger plants to bid higher prices to attract cattle and draw cattle 
away from smaller firm and drives up its costs. 
Several agricultural economists have estimated the relationship between captive 
supplies and spot cattle prices over many years span. Azzam (2002) found a negative 
relationship between the captive supply and the spot market price.  This indicates that 
when the captive supply goes up, the spot prices in the cattle market go down.  Many 
researchers agree that there is a negative relationship between captive supplies and spot 
market prices (Ward and Hornung, 2004; Schroeter and Azzam, 2004; Sexton and Zhang, 
2000).  However, they differ on whether or not the negative relationship means that an 
increase in captive supply usage causes a decline in cattle prices, thus hurting 
independent cattle producers. Azzam (2002) made a distinction between regional level 
and plant level analysis of the relationship between captive supplies and spot market 
prices.  According to him, “the tendency for spot market cattle prices to be ‘low,’ other 
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things equal, in weeks in which captive supply slaughter is ‘high,’ does not necessarily 
mean that there is an underlying mechanism whereby large deliveries of captive supply 
cattle in a particular week cause that week's spot market price to fall. Even if the week-
to-week fluctuations in a region's spot market price of fed cattle were generated 
completely independently of the region's use of captive supplies, the incentives that 
influence the delivery scheduling decisions of feeders and packers would still give rise to 
a negative correlation between the observed spot price and the volume of captive 
supplies.”
Continuing on the debate whether the relationship between captive supplies and 
spot market is just correlation or causal, Zhang and Sexton (2000) claim that the 
relationship between captive supplies and spot market prices is not just causal but rather a 
deliberate management activity of packers. The packers have created a buffer zone 
within which they exercise monopoly power. This has effectively reduced the spot 
market price, as packers have less incentive to jump the buffer zone and come to the 
competitive market. 
Schroeter and Azzam (2004) also tried to determine whether the relationship 
between captive supplies and spot market prices are correlation or causation. They 
concluded that captive supplies have effectively reduced spot market prices. They found 
a negative relationship not between the contemporaneous level of captive supplies and 
price but between captive supplies and an ex ante exp ectation of a week-to-week price 
change. 
Ward, Koontz, and Schroeder (1998) assumed a purely competitive market in the 
beef industry. They claim that captive supplies affect both demand for and supply of 
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cattle so the effect on the competitive price is not clear. The relative effect, according to 
them, depends on the specific market. Love and Burton (1999) relaxed the assumption of 
a competitive market and included vertical integration of the feeder and the packer. They 
found a negative sign of elasticity of supply. But they could not conclude that the 
negative sign is due to market power, because according to them, vertical integration 
helps packers gain efficiency as the supply of cattle will be under their control.
Elam (1992) and Eilrich et al. (1990) found that spot market prices were lower than 
contract market prices and concluded that it could be the price they were paying for not 
having to bear the risk involved. They also found that captive supply deliveries were 
inversely related to fed cattle prices. Hayenga and O'Brien (1990) examined the effect of 
captive supplies on weekly average fed cattle prices and price variability, they found 
effects that were usually not significant or that had mixed positive and negative signs 
relative to other market prices. Schroeder et al. (1993) report a negative relationship 
between forward contracting and fed cattle prices. Price impacts differed among packers 
and sub periods within the six-month period and were not significant for some packers 
and time periods.
Packers’ incentives to engage in contract markets, according to Zhang and Sexton 
(2000), is the profit they make by creating the buffer zone which enables them to exercise 
monopoly power. No packer will have the incentive to jump the buffer zone, which they 
created due to locational advantage, and be involved in the spot (competitive) market. 
This act, in effect, will depress the spot market price. The other incentive, according to 
Schroeter and Azzam (2004), is the profit they gain by the reduced prices of the spot 
market due to ex ante expectation of future changes in price. 
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Contract market price is, at times, settled using calculations based on 
contemporaneous market prices. Sexton and Xia (2002) examined the competitive 
implications of such pricing arrangements, “focusing in particular upon so-called “top of 
the market pricing (TOMP)” in cattle procurement, wherein the contract guarantees the 
producer the highest cash price prevailing at the time of delivery”.  They showed that 
contracts have a depressing effect on the spot market prices especially when, “…the same 
buyers who purchase contract cattle with the TOMP clause also compete to procure cattle 
in the subsequent spot market.” 
One of the important variables that enter the contract is the quality of the cattle at 
the time of delivery.  A number of hedonic studies exist pertaining to the quality of beef. 
May, Forristall and Lawrence (2002) assessed the cost of keeping the quality of beef. 
The positive and negative correlations between carcass traits and carcass and 
performance traits result in economic tradeoffs that change across input costs and quality 
grade premiums and discounts. The long-run trend in the U.S. beef industry is having 
fewer cattle grade Choice and more grade Select. Ward and Hogan (2003) built models 
for estimating beef quality.  They concluded that, “… if a producer markets fed cattle on 
a grid, there appears to be an advantage in the first quarter of the year for cattle likely to 
grade a higher percentage of quality grade Select. For heavier cattle more likely to 
contain a higher percentage of yield grade 4-5 carcasses, a producer would appear to 
benefit with an anticipated marketing date in the second quarter”. 
Several papers used a data set from GIPSA.  The USDA, being concerned about 
the effect of captive supplies on the spot market prices, has issued a mandatory price 
reporting by the packers. The Livestock Mandatory Reporting Act of 1999 requires meat 
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packers to report detailed price and quantity information on cattle, hogs, lambs, and 
products to United States Department of Agriculture’s Agricultural Marketing Service 
(AMS) on a daily basis. The Livestock Mandatory Reporting Act mandates reporting of 
transaction data only by beef-packers who slaughter annually an average of 125,000 
cattle, pork packers who slaughter annually 100,000 swine, or lamb packers who 
slaughter 75,000 lambs. Although the thresholds exempt close to 94 percent of cattle 
packers, 93 percent of pork packers, and 97 percent of lamb packers, mandatory reporting 
accounts for 80-95 percent of the cattle, boxed beef, slaughter hog, sheep, and lamb 
(MacDonald et al., 2004).
The anticipated positive effect is that transparency enhances competition. As 
compared to the GIPSA data set which was obtained through a voluntary price reporting 
by packers, this one is more complete and reliable. There are only few missing values 
and has a high rate of accuracy (no simulation or estimation methods to make the data 
balanced).
Azzam (1998) on his study about the effect of the new data set concluded 
that “…the usefulness of the Act to the livestock industry may not be in the value of 
reported information to the feeders, as the supporters of the Act claim.  Rather, by forcing 
packers to pool information at negligible marginal cost, the Act may foster more 




This paper uses the new data set from the Mandatory Price Reporting Act.  The 
data was released beginning from April, 2001.  A weekly data of spot market prices, 
amount of cattle delivered through the marketing agreement and forward contract, are 
used.  Data for the cost of cattle delivery and quality are collected from GIPSA.  The 
paper uses time series data of April 2001 to December 2004 and five states: Nebraska, 
Kansas, Colorado, New Mexico, and Texas-Oklahoma.  The selected states produce the 
majority of beef in the U.S. and the top four packers are also located in these regions.  
Table 1 shows the summary statistics for each of the states.  This data set is believed to 
be superior to the data set from GIPSA because in the latter type data is collected 
voluntarily and therefore is not complete.  The Mandatory Reporting Act compels 
packers to report data about their price and income level, and this makes it a complete 
data set, though it records the average of the week and not daily transactions. The GIPSA 
data set records each transaction of the cattle market but have a lot of missing values.  A 
complete data set is very important especially in a panel data analysis.   The data for the 
quality of the cattle delivered is based on USDA’s classification of cattle quality as 
select, choice, standard, and premium (1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 for each category).  The number 
of cattle in each category is used to quantify the variable. The average of each day is 
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taken for the week’s data and the same is done for each state.  There were not much of a 
difference in the quality of cattle from week to week, but difference was observed from 
state to state.
Data is collected from the two types of cattle delivery method in captive 
supplies: marketing agreement and forward contract.  In the marketing agreement, there 
is a standing agreement between the feeder and the packer to transact a certain number 
of cattle at a certain price level.  Price is determined by a formula which involves the 
base price and attributes of the cattle such as yield grade, quality grade, and carcass 
weight.  The base price tends to be related to the spot market price at the time of 
delivery.  The marketing agreement gives the discretion of determining the volume of 
cattle to be delivered to the feeder while the specific date of delivery is determined by 
the packer.  In case of forward contract, the feeder determines the volume of cattle 
delivery in a certain future period of time while the schedule of delivery within that 




This research uses a panel data analysis.  The data was also pooled and OLS was 
used to estimate the variables for comparative purposes.  It is expected that the 
different cross-sections may have different error variances. Greene (2000, p. 594), 
notes that for a cross-country comparison there may be variation in the scales of the 
variables in the model. It is also expected that there will be cross-section 
contemporaneous error correlation.  The Breusch-Pagan Lagrange multiplier statistic 
was used to test for a diagonal covariance matrix (that is, no cross-section correlation) 
(Greene 2000, p. 601).  As expected, cross-sectional contemporaneous error 
correlation was found.  Based on the results, shown in table 2, it was concluded that 
just pooling the time series and cross-section data is not a good method for estimating 
the variables.
There has been a debate in the captive supply regarding whether the negative 
relationship between captive supplies and spot market prices is simply a correlation or
is in fact causation.  The general goal is not to study associations between variables 
(which is the case for studies that involve forecasting), but to assess causal 
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relationships between variables.  Some researchers have used price as the dependent 
variable while others have used contract markets as the dependent variable.  
This research uses the Granger Causality Test to determine the cause and effect 
relationship (Greene, 2000).  The PROC VARMAX procedure was used in SAS.  
The test hypothesis is marketing agreement (forward contract) is the dependent variable 
while the alternative hypothesis is price is the dependent variable.  Test 1 has marketing 
agreement (forward market) as the dependent variable while spot market price was the 
explanatory variable.  Test 2, on the other hand, has price as the dependent variable and 
marketing agreement (forward market) as the explanatory variable.  The results are 
shown in Tables 3 and 4.  The results show that the test 2 is significant at 5% level of 
confidence while test 1 is insignificant for both marketing agreement and forward 
contract.  This means that captive supplies are affecting the spot market prices and not 
the other way around.  Following the above results, the spot market price was used as 
the dependent variable while marketing agreements and future markets are used as 
explanatory variables.
Following the causality tests, a price dependent model is specified as: 
itititititit cstqltyamtamtP εααααα +++++= 43210 21                     (1)
where Pit is the spot market price at week t in state i, amt1  is the amount of cattle 
delivered in the marketing agreement by state i in week t , amt2 is the amount of cattle 
delivered in the forward contract market by state i in week t , qlty is the quality of 
cattle delivered at time t and state i, cstit is the transportation cost of delivering cattle 
by farmers to packers, and ε is the random disturbance term.  Quality of cattle and 
transportation cost are included in the model to take in to account the effects of beef 
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quality and transportation cost in changing spot market price.  They are both expected 
to affect spot market price positively.  The higher the quality of cattle is, the higher its 
price is in the market.  As the cost of transporting the cattle from farm to packer 
increases, cattle price tend to increases.
To determine the effect of captive supplies on the spot market prices, 
coefficients of the amount of cattle supplied due to the marketing agreement contracts 
and future market contracts at time t (α1 and α 2) are estimated.  To determine the effect 
of quality on the spot market prices, the coefficient of quality of cattle (α 3) is 
estimated.
There may be time lag in the causal relationship between the spot market price 
and the captive supply.  In other words, today’s shipment may have impact on today’s 
spot market price as well as spot market prices in the future.  The Pearson’s 
correlation coefficient was used to examine this issue.  Table 5 shows that, the degree 
of correlation decreases for both marketing agreement and future market contracts, 
from current period to seven weeks lag period.  The correlation converges to zero as 
the number of lag periods increase.  This means that there is a cumulative effect of all 
lag periods of the contract markets in the spot market price.  Koyck’s (Theil, 1971) 
method (explained above) of converting the distributed lag form into an autoregressive 
lag form is used to see the cumulative effect of the lags.
Koyck’s method was used to find the cumulative effect of the lag periods of the 
captive supplies on the spot market prices.  Considering Koyck’s method, equation (1) 
is rewritten as1:
1 We also consider cumulative lag structure of quality and cost variable for the derivation purpose.  
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Estimating equation (2) is a difficult task mainly due to the multicollinearity 
problem.  To estimate equation (2), we impose an assumption that the multiplicative 
coefficients, α1 – α8 and β1 – β8 converge to zero (The coefficients γ1 – γ2 and θ1 – θ2, 
are also assumed to converge to zero but they are not the focus in this study).  More 
specifically, we assume the decline takes a geometric fashion.  That is:
α2 = µ α1, α3 = µ2 α1, α4 = µ3 α1 . . .
β2 = µ β1, β3 = µ2β1, β4 = µ3 β1 . . .
γ2 = µ γ1, γ3 = µ2 γ1, γ4 = µ3 γ1 . . .
θ2 = µ θ1, θ3 = µ2 θ1, θ4 = µ3 θ1 . . . ,
where 0< µ < 1.




































Subtracting (3) from (2) yields:
Pit =(1-µ)α0 +µ Pit-1  + α1amt1it +  β1amt2it  +  γ1qltyit  +  θ1cstit-m + (ε it - µε it-1 ) (4)
The error term in equation (4), (ε it - µε it-1), is not a random error term as is assumed in 
an Ordinary Least Square regression analysis.  However, if the sample size is large 
enough, the OLS result should not be affected by the randomness of ε it-1 (Theil, 1971).
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There are two types of models in the panel data analysis: fixed effect and the 
random effect models.  The Hausman specification test (Greene, 2000) was used to 
examine whether the fixed or random effects model should be used.  The hypothesis 
is, to test whether there is a significant correlation between the random effect and 
regressors.  If the correlation is not significant the random effect model can be used to 
estimate.  If there is a significant correlation between the error terms and the 
regressors, the fixed effect model would be chosen.  
The test statistics shows that the m-value (correlation coefficient) is 13.67 while 
the probability value is 0.142.  The test statistics indicate that there is a significant 
correlation between the random effects and the regressors at the 5 percent level.  
Therefore, the random effect model is used instead of the fixed effect model in this 
research. 
When the random effect model is a regression with a random constant term over
cross-sectional units (states in our case), but constant over time (weeks in our case), 
the model is called one-way random effect model.  However, when the random effects 
are considered over both cross-section and time series, the error components model are 
referred to as the two-way random effects model.   In this case, the typical error term 
should be uncorrelated with both time series and cross-sectional component errors.  
This study considers the two-way random effects, and TSCS RANTWO procedure 
was used in SAS.
Autocorrelation is also tested in this study using the Durbin-Watson test
(Greene, 2000).  The presence of autocorrelation may be different for each panel or it 
may be uniform across the panels.  The number of temporal observations was greater 
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than the number of regressors in this study, so it is assumed that there are common 
autocorrelation across all panels. Heteroscedasticity problem can also arise from 
group wise differences in the panel data.  Both White and Breusch-Pagan tests were 
used to detect the presence of heteroscedasticity.  Table 12 shows the presence of both 
autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity.  A weight-adjusted combination of the White 
and Newey-West (Greene, 2000) estimator was used to address heteroscedasticity and 




Correlation coefficient matrix shows that the spot market price at the week t is the 
most correlated with shipments from marketing agreement and forward contract 
markets at the week t. The result also shows that the spot market price is correlated 
with shipments from lagged periods of marketing agreement and forward contracts.   
The coefficient converges to zero as the lag increases.  The lag of t-8 and beyond was 
found to be significantly reducing as compared to lags until t-7. Therefore only 7 lag 
weeks were used.  Koyck’s method was used to estimate the cumulative effect of the 
lags of the 7 weeks. 
PROC TSCS RANTWO was used in SAS to run the panel data regression. The 
distributed lag form of Koyck’s method was used to estimate the effect of the 
cumulative lags of marketing agreement and forward contract on the spot market 
prices.  Then, Cross-sectional and time series data were pooled and the ordinary linear 
regression was used in SAS to compare results from both regression procedures.  The 
panel data and pooled data regression were conducted for both the current period and 
the distributed lag form of Koyck’s method.  Both pooled and panel estimation was 
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conducted with and without the quality variable to study the importance of quality as 
an explanatory variable in the model.  
Table 6 shows the results of the reduced form of Koyck’s method of the pooled 
data.  The distributed lags of Koyck’s method were recovered from the results of the 
reduced lag form.  Table 7 shows the results of both current and distributed lag of 
pooled data regression with and without quality.  From the results it can be seen that 
both coefficients of marketing agreement and forward contracts are significant in the 
pooled data regression using the current shipment at the 5% level of significance.  The 
quality variable is significant at the 10% level of significance.  Results of the pooled 
data regression of distributed lag show that all lagged variables of marketing 
agreement and forward contract are insignificant at the 5% level of significance and all 
coefficients show a negative sign as expected.  Quality of cattle was significant at the 
10% level while transportation cost was significant at the 5% level. All coefficients in 
this regression have correct signs.
Results of the reduced form of Koyck’s method, from the panel data regression 
are shown in table 8.  The coefficients of distributed lags of Koyck’s method were 
recovered from the results from the regression of reduced lag form.  Table 9 shows the 
panel data regression results of both current and distributed lags with and without 
quality.  In the regression with current shipment marketing agreement was found to be 
significant at 10% level of significance with the quality variable while it was found to 
be not significant without the quality variable. On the same regression forward 
contract was found to be significant at the 5% level of significance.  Results of the 
distributed lag form show that both contract marketing and forward contract are 
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significant at the 5% level. Quality of cattle was found to be significant at the 10% 
level of significance. As expected marketing agreement and forward markets had a 
negative sign while quality of cattle had a positive sign. 
Price elasticity of marketing agreement, forward contract and quality of cattle 
were calculated based on estimate values of the panel data estimates of lagged values.  
The results, table 10, show that for each additional cattle supplied in the marketing 
agreement price decreases by 0.1501 cents.  Likewise, for each additional cattle 
supplied in the forward contract, price decreases by 0.2238 cents.  For each additional 
cattle supplied in an upgraded quality level, price increases by 0.2546 cents. 
Based on these results, it can be concluded that quality is an important 
explanatory variable in the relationship between captive supplies and spot market 
prices.  As expected, a positive relationship between quality of cattle and spot market 
prices was found. The results also showed that both marketing agreement and 
forward contract of the distributed lag form are significant.  From this it can be 
concluded that the negative relationship is not just between the current period of spot 
market prices and captive supplies but also that there is a cumulative effect of lag 
periods of captive supplies on the current spot market price.     
Comparing the distributed lag results of tables 6 and 7 with that of table 8 and 9, 
it can be seen that variables of pooled data are not significant at 5% confidence level 
while variables of panel data are significant at the 5% confidence levels.  The 
Breusch-Pagan Lagrange multiplier statistic used to test for a diagonal covariance 
matrix also shows that, cross-sectional contemporaneous error correlation was found. 
Though it can not be concluded, from the output, pooling data is wrong, statistical 
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In the past 30 to 40 years contracts markets have grown to have a significant share.    
A recent USDA report shows that (MacDonald, et al 2004) contracts share of the 
market is about 50% while the largest four packers slaughter 80% of the 
cattle(MacDonald et al., 2004). An important question is will the shift in the marketing 
structure depress the spot market price?
The improvement in technology in the processing industry, like the ‘beef 
boxing’ technology, coupled with an increasing demand of quality products, has 
necessitated a closer follow up and coordination of the supply chain management. 
The contracts are considered to enable farmers the risk associated with their business.  
The risk is shared by packers who are in an advantageous position to take the risks.  
As small entities in the business, producers are liable to price fluctuations and 
therefore are prone to high risk.  This, of course, may be at the expense of reduced 
prices and income at the farm level.  High transportation cost and lack of full 
information are among the variables that led producers to engage in contracts.   The 
contracts have given packers the advantage of lower prices and standardized quality 
products.  The cost of contracts for packers is writing contracts every time for each lot 
of cattle sold and the risk of producers not being able to fulfill the contracts. 
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Many researchers agree that captive supplies and spot market prices have 
inverse relationships.  The debate is on the cause and effect relationship. Zhang and 
Sexton (2000) assert that the relationship between captive supplies and spot market 
prices is not just causal but rather a deliberate management activity of packers.
Schroeter and Azzam (2004) concluded that captive supplies have effectively reduced 
spot market prices. They found a negative relationship not between the 
contemporaneous level of captive supplies and price but between captive supplies and 
an ex ante expectation of a week-to-week price change.
This paper also examined the cause and effect relationship between captive 
supplies and spot market prices.  Unlike previous researches, which used either only 
temporal or spatial dimensions, a panel data analysis was used.   To test the cause and 
effect relationship the Granger Causality Test was used. It was found that captive 
supplies affect spot market prices and not the other way around.  The Pearson’s 
Correlation Coefficient matrix showed that spot market prices are correlated the most 
with current period shipments of cattle but are also correlated with lagged period 
shipments. The effect decreases as the number of lag period increases.  The Koyck’s 
method was used to estimate the cumulative effect of the lag periods.  The data was 
pooled and Ordinary Least Square procedure was used for current and lag periods with 
and without the quality variable.   The panel data regression was also used for current 
and lagged periods with and without the quality variable. 
From the results of both regressions it was found that marketing agreement, 
forward market and quality of cattle significantly affect spot market prices when the 
panel data regression was used. It was also found that both the current and lagged 
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weeks affect spot market prices, though the current week affects the most.  The signs 
of marketing agreement and forward contract were found to be negative while quality 
has a positive sign. Findings in this study were consistent with previous studies such 
as Zhang and Sexton (2000) and Schroeter and Azzam (2004). 
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Table 1.  Descriptive Statistics
Marketing Agreement Forward Contract




Colorado 605.0000 29.1100 202.0000 22.0124
Kansas 623.8000 30.0169 209.2000 18.0194
Nebraska 618.0000 36.0821 201.0000 29.9600
New Mexico 653.0000 35.4232 208.0000 23.3200
Texas-Oklahoma 634.0000 29.5668 214.0000 21.3269
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Table 2: The Breusch-Pagan Lagrange multiplier test
Test Statistics 51.4400




Table 3.  Granger Causality Test
Chi-Square Pr > 
ChiSq
Test 1:
Dependent variable: Marketing 
Agreement
Explanatory variable:  Price
5.46 0.2567
Test 2:




Table 4.  Granger Causality Test
Chi-Square Pr > 
ChiSq
Test 1:
















No Lag -0.49481 No Lag -0.43730
Lag 1 -0.48952 Lag 1 -0.43419
Lag 2 -0.48670 Lag 2 -0.43046
Lag 3 -0.48656 Lag 3 -0.42950
Lag 4 -0.47761 Lag 4 -0.42482
Lag 5 -0.47724 Lag 5 -0.42416
Lag 6 -0.47725 Lag 6 -0.42045
Lag 7 -0.47417 Lag 7 -0.41695
Lag 8 -0.23167 Lag 8 -0.21366
Lag 9 -0.13476 Lag 9 -0.10978
Lag 10 -0.09867 Lag 10 -0.07986
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   * Significant at the 5% level of significance
** Significant at the 10% level of significance
     Standard Errors are given in parenthesis 
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Table 7.  Pooled Data Estimation Using Distributed Lag form of Koyck’s Method




















































































































































   * Significant at the 5% level of significance
** Significant at the 10% level of significance
     Standard Errors are given in parenthesis 
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Table 9.  Panel Data Estimation Using Distributed Lag form of Koyck’s Method



















































































































Quality of Cattle 0.2546
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Table 11: Tests for Autocorrelation and Heteroscedasticity
Statistics Durbin Watson Breusch-Pagan White
1.5790 13.3650 17.8910
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